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ABSTRACT
Law has traditionally relied on age markers to distinguish between juvenile and
adult offenders, while ignoring the category of young adult offenders. This article defines
young adults, young adult offenders and young adulthood as the ages between 18 and 24.
Young adulthood is a social category, but it is affected by ongoing psychological and
neurological development. Age-crime theories have demonstrated that the age of young
adulthood creates a risk factor for criminal behavior. The same behavioral and
developmental components that put young adults at risk of coming into contact with the
law simultaneously support their potential for rehabilitation; an argument closely linked
to why children are adjudged by the juvenile justice system. Scholars and scientists have
recommended the adjudication of young adult offenders in systems separate from adult
criminal procedures and sanctions, but few human rights and criminal justice systems
have applied these findings to young adult offenders. This article examines regional
systems recommendations on young adult offenders and certain European states’ systems
such as Germany who have accounted for young adult offenders within the juvenile
jurisdiction or created a separate category for young adult offenders. On the contrary,
international human rights law and international criminal law cling to the Straight 18
approach, segregating children under 18 years from adults, and ignoring the category of
young adults. Additionally, the U.S. works with a less strict interpretation of the Straight
18 approach within its juvenile jurisdiction by promoting some juveniles to the adult
criminal system. Such practices make it difficult to then acquire a third category for
young adult offenders or expand the juvenile jurisdiction to incorporate those under 25
years. International human rights law and criminal law jurisdictions should reflect the
social and scientific findings on young adulthood by either including young adults under
25 years within the juvenile jurisdiction or implementing a third category for young adult
offenders.
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Introduction
Human rights has overlooked the distinct transitional phase of young adulthood and the
protections of this vulnerable age group, particularly, in regard to the treatment of young
adult offenders. Young adulthood has been defined by scholars, social scientists, medical
scientists and within the Ibero-American Youth Rights Convention (IAYRC) as
individuals in their teens to mid-twenties. This article defines young adults, young adult
offenders and young adulthood as the ages between 18 and 24. These age parameters for
young adults are based on social and scientific research; and legal precedence within
certain regional and domestic legal systems.
Defining childhood, adulthood and other “age-hoods” within the dynamic
universal human rights system is tricky because of varying ideas about childhood and
adulthood and the age markers associated with these terms. Nonetheless, law has
traditionally relied on age to distinguish between children and adults; meanwhile, most
international, regional and domestic systems have not accounted for the young adult
category. International human rights law has inappropriately grouped young adults with
adults, a fall out from international doctrines such as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) that defines the age of a child as anyone under 18 years 1 and by default
those 18 years and over are considered adults. “In general, humanitarian and human
rights organizations have adopted the so-called ‘Straight 18’ position, which sets forth a
universal age of childhood as beginning at birth and ending at age eighteen.” 2 “The
Straight-18 approach is very ambitious in that it advocates the creation of a single
comprehensive definition of childhood in a world where ideas about childhood and the
legal rights of children vary significantly.” 3 The Straight 18 approach has also influenced
the more recent discourse of international criminal law, which has wrestled with how to
adjudge juveniles for international crimes related to human rights violations, while
positioning young adults under the jurisdiction of adult criminal liability for international
crimes.
1

The Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm [hereinafter CRC].
2
David M. Rosen, Who Is A Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 81, 96
(2009-2010).
3
Id.

1

The Straight 18 approach typically separates juvenile from adult offenders. It is
helpful in that it defines a juvenile system and protects youth; however, it could be
modified to include young adults under 25 years, or legal systems could maintain the
juvenile jurisdiction and create a third jurisdiction for young adult offenders between 18
and 24 years. These optional legal systems exist in some European states such as
Germany and Austria.
By virtue of their stage of development, young adults test boundaries and
demonstrate impetuous behaviors which at times are more similar to their juvenile
counterparts than that of a seasoned adult. These menacing actions can result in contact
with the law, law that imposes long-lasting punitive effects on individuals’ lives and does
not differentiate between a young adult, and an adult. In many regards, teenagers and
young adults want to be treated as full-fledged adults, yet in certain sectors such as
criminal law, where the loss of liberty (during pre-trial detention or confinement
sentencing) interrupts the transition to adulthood and the loss of life (by death penalty– an
irrevocable life-altering consequence), are areas of law in which neither children nor
young adults should assume full adult responsibilities because they have not attained
adult psychosocial development and neurological functioning. Moreover, scholars urge
that “[c]rimes committed by still-developing young people […] are less blameworthy
than equivalent acts by adults; further, youths’ developmental plasticity makes them more
likely to stop offending – if, that is, we provide them with conditions conducive to
rehabilitation.” 4
Young adulthood is an intrinsically complicated phase as young people attempt to
find their route to the adult world through social and economic responsibility, while
psychological and neurological attributes finalize development. Social and scientific
research cannot delineate a specified age marking the exact onset of adulthood because of
the respective developmental processes, but it can provide age ranges in which these
functions mature. Technological advances in brain imaging shows that neurological
development continues into the twenties and this evidence correlates with behavioral

4

Terry Mahoney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 89, 90 (2009).

2

research indicating that adulthood is reached during the twenties. 5 Few regional and
domestic legal systems have relied on behavioral and neuroscience findings on young
adulthood. In fact, most legal systems are out of touch with the current research, which is
clear in the limited amount of rights and protections directed at young adults. Collectively
using sociology, psychology and neuroscience research on young adulthood could guide
legal systems to define young adult offenders, as those between 18 and 24 years
deserving of non-adult criminal procedures and sanctions, by either promoting young
adults’ inclusion within the juvenile jurisdiction; or creating a third category, or
jurisdiction, that renders young adults less culpable than adult offenders.
Where the universal system of human rights has failed to identify and make
recommendations for young adults, regional systems and certain European states have
taken the initiative to recognize the unique phase of young adulthood and adjudicate
young adult offenders under a different set of penal standards. The age range of young
adult offenders varies among European states, but the upper age range is between 21 and
25 years. 6 This has been achieved by one of two ways: including young adults within the
juvenile jurisdiction or adjudicating young adult offenders under a less punitive penal
jurisdiction than the adult criminal system. It is necessary to offer background on the
logic behind juvenile systems to understand the reasoning for the inclusion of young
adult offenders within this jurisdiction. The minimum age of criminal responsibility
(MACR) describes the lowest age limit for the application of juvenile law, 7 while terms
such as “the age of penal majority” or “the age of criminal responsibility” typically define
the lowest age limit for adult culpability under adult criminal law. 8 For example, in
Germany the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 14 years, a much higher
5

Claudia Dreifus, A Conversation with Laurence Steinberg: Developmental Psychologist Says Teenagers
are Different, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/science/01conv.html?_r=1.
6
TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD, YOUNG ADULTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
PRACTICES 3 (2010), available at http://www.t2a.org.uk/publications [hereinafter T2A, YOUNG ADULTS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND PRACTICES].
7
DON CIPRIANI, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 117 (Farnham: Ashgate 2009).
8
Compare Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Law, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/age+of+majority
[hereinafter Dictionary, Age of Majority] (“age of majority” is “the age at which a person is granted by law
the rights (as ability to sue) and responsibilities (as liability under contract) of an adult.”) with LawGlossary.com, http://www.law-glossary.com/definition/age-of-criminal-responsibility.html (“age of
criminal responsibility” is “the age at which a person is considered to be capable of committing a crime”).
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minimum age of criminal responsibility than “the emerging international standard of a
minimum of 12 years” 9 and much higher than many countries that include a younger
child population within juvenile law. 10 In Germany “[t]urning 18 does not automatically
lead to the application of adult criminal law.” 11 Germany’s juvenile justice system is
applicable for young people between the ages of 14 and 21, 12 and the courts are allowed
discretion to sentence young adults between the ages of 18 and 21 under juvenile or adult
laws. 13 German legislation includes young adults within the juvenile jurisdiction because
it recognizes that often times the majority of young adult offenders are developmentally
similar to juveniles and imposing adult sanctions could negatively impede rehabilitation.
On the contrary, young adults in the United States (U.S.) are treated as adults
within the federal and state criminal justice systems; however, there are some states’
jurisdictions in which juveniles under 18 years are transferred to the adult system. In the
U.S. 15 states’ juvenile jurisdictions have established minimum ages of criminal
responsibility ranging between six and ten years, while the remaining states and the
federal juvenile justice system are devoid of minimum ages of criminal responsibility. 14
In the U.S. “47 states use 17 or 18 as the age at which most minors are treated as adults.
North Carolina, Connecticut and New York draw the line of adulthood for criminal
culpability even at the age of 16.” 15 The U.S. has taken an opposite position to some
European states; and a similar approach to international human rights instruments and the
Straight 18 approach by categorizing those 18 years and over within the adult group, but
also inappropriately promoting juveniles under 18 years to the adult criminal system.
9

DON CIPRIANI, supra note 7, at 117.
See generally id. at 187-224 (the following countries: Bahrain, Cambodia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, France, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nauru,
Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan and the United States have either MACR of 0
years or do not have a MACR).
11
HORST ENTORF, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 5434, TURNING 18: WHAT A DIFFERENCE APPLICATION OF
ADULT CRIMINAL LAW MAKES 2 (Jan. 2011), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp5434.pdf.
12
DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL THE NETHERLANDS, KIDS BEHIND BARS 55 (Stan Meuwese ed.,
Stenco Amsterdam 2003), available at http://www.defenceforchildren.org/juvenile-justice/jjresources.html.
13
T2A, YOUNG ADULTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND PRACTICES, supra note 6, at
3.
14
DON CIPRIANI, supra note 7, at 117-118.
15
HORST ENTORF, supra note 11, at 2 (citation omitted) (transfer from juvenile to adult court is based on
certain offender and offense requirements).
10

4

This article examines international, regional and national definitions of young
adult and legal practices on the adjudication of young adult offenders, or the lack thereof
as is the situation in the U.S. The purpose of this article is to elucidate on ideas and
practices of including young adult offenders within the juvenile jurisdiction by raising the
upper age to include young adults under 25 years; or creating a third category to
adjudicate 18 to 24 year olds in a system that has similar principles as juvenile justice and
is less punitive than adult criminal law. The article begins in Part I with the foundation on
the distinctiveness of young adulthood by reviewing social and scientific research on
young adult development. These theories are rooted in regional doctrines and state laws
which have recognized that young adulthood is different from adulthood. Part II looks at
regional efforts by Europe and Ibero-America to recognize young adults and reviews
certain European states’ jurisdictions that exclude young adults from adult criminal law
by incorporating young adult offenders within the juvenile jurisdiction or adjudicating
young adult offenders in a jurisdiction separate from juvenile and adult criminal law. Part
III examines how international human rights law has promoted the Straight 18 approach
within juvenile justice and international criminal law, while omitting the category of
young adult offenders. The U.S. criminal justice system provides a contrasting example
of a state that maintains a less strict interpretation of the Straight 18 approach by
promoting juveniles to adult criminal court. Part IV analyzes the consequences of adult
criminal law on young adults’ transition to adulthood. Lastly, the conclusion suggests
minimal recommendations on the treatment of young adult offenders within either the
juvenile jurisdiction or a separate category.

5

I. Young Adult Development: Between teen and adult
A. Criminology Theories Define Young Adults
Many of us can recall a time in our teens or even in our twenties when impulsivity, poor
judgment and lack of foresight about prospective consequences resulted in a bad choice.
Understanding why young adults engage in criminal activity has been traditionally
researched by social scientists with many of the research results corroborating across
social science discourses. Interestingly, criminologists and crime statisticians have
historically categorized adolescence and young adult age groups and examined these
groups’ propensity to commit crime. It is here the discussion on young adults and crime
begins with the popular age-crime curve theory which argues that young adults typically
age out of crime. The age-crime theory supports that the majority of young adults
involved in criminal behavior are not lifetime persistent offenders, but rather individuals
in a stage of impulsivity and risk-taking that is governed by under developed
psychosocial characteristics and neurological functions.
“Most criminologists agree that people commit less crime as they age” 16 and in
some countries this theory is substantiated by crime statistics. “Criminological research
[has] consistently […] confirmed that (the proportion of) the population involved in
crime tends to peak in adolescence or early adulthood and then decline with age. This
age-crime relationship is remarkably similar across historical periods, geographic
locations, and crime types.” 17 The age-crime theory is broad and steady; “and it can be
viewed as a universal phenomenon in all countries” 18 making its theoretical application a
useful incorporation into international and regional human rights laws, which rely on
wide-reaching theories and recommendations that are malleable to changing temporal
periods and numerous disparate nations’ practices.
16

LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY THEORIES, PATTERNS, AND TYPOLOGIES 53 (Wadsworth, Cengage
Learning 10th ed. 2010) (citation omitted).
17
DARRELL STEFFENSMEIER & JEFFERY ULMER, AGE AND CRIME – AGE-CRIME PATTERNS FOR THE U.S.,
VARIATIONS IN THE AGE CURVE, VARIATIONS IN CRIMINAL CAREERS, available at
http://law.jrank.org/pages/ 479/Age-Crime.html.
18
Frieder Dünkel & Ineke Pruin, Young adult offenders in the criminal justice systems of European
countries, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE: CURRENT SITUATION AND REFORM DEVELOPMENTS
1557, 1562 (Frieder Dünkel, Joanna Grzywa, Philip Horsfield & Ineke Pruin eds., Forum Verlag Godesberg
2010) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Dünkel & Pruin, Young adult offenders in the criminal justice systems
of European countries].
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Research on the age-crime theory is also supported by crime statistics. This article
will use statistics from Germany and the U.S. since they are the main countries of
comparison with opposing penal practices on the treatment of young adult offenders. In a
study examining a one hundred year span of the age-crime curve in Germany, results
showed that in 1900, 1970 and 1980 the peak age of crime was between 18 and 21
years. 19 In 1990 the peak increased to 25 years 20 and in 2000 and 2006 the peak age of
crime maintained around 25 years. 21 “[T]he age-crime-curve has not changed since the
beginning of the last century, but the peak […] has continuously moved to the right, i.e.
to the age group of 21-25.” 22 One explanation for the older age parameters may be a
longer period of young adulthood in Germany, which is understood through discourses
on socioeconomic trends and young adult psychological and neurological development.
The U.S. has experienced a similar trend with young adult offenders. Official
records such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report
(UCR) demonstrate young adults’ majority percentage within the criminal justice system.
“The UCR includes both crimes reported to local law enforcement departments and the
number of arrests made by police agencies.” 23 The UCR is useful because it tallies the
number of arrests by age; however, it does not report the number of arrests that led to
convictions and it excludes the number of arrests from traffic violations. 24 The 2009 UCR
“Arrests by Age” exemplifies the stark increase in arrests for those between 18 and 24
years over other age groups, and confirms the age-crime theory within this sample. In
2009, 1,515,586 (14.1%) of those arrested were under 18 years; but the arrest rate
doubled for 18 to 24 year olds with 3,167,733 (29.4%) arrests; and declined for 24 to 29
year olds with 1,556,740 (14.5%) arrests. 25 Within these U.S. based statistics it appears
that young adults (18 to 24 years) are more likely to come into conflict with the law than
19

Id. at 1562.
Id.
21
See id. (figure: 2 Conviction rates according to age groups, Germany 1886-2006 (per 100,000 of the age
group)).
22
Id. (citation omitted).
23
LARRY J. SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 30.
24
Id.
25
See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Arrests by Age, 2009 (Sept. 2010),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_38.html#overview [hereinafter FBI, Arrests by Age, 2009]
(arrests numbers and percentage for the age range, 18 to 24 years, was tallied by adding the “Total” and the
“Total percent distribution” for the following age categories: 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 years in the
Arrests by Age, 2009 table).
20
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other age groups, and it suggests that the transition to young adulthood has lengthened, as
well.
The German and U.S. based statistics indicate that young adults are a significant
population within these criminal systems. Since this age group generally ages out of
crime they demand consideration under a non-adult system, either by including those
under 25 years within the juvenile jurisdiction, or situating 18 to 24 year olds within a
third category that is separate from adult criminal law.

1. Age-graded Theory of Informal Social Control: Aging out of crime
during the transition to adulthood
The age-graded theory of crime suggests that “[a]s people mature, the factors that
influence their propensity to commit crime change.” 26 Many of these factors are related
to responsibility which is influenced by psychosocial maturity. Criminologists Robert
Sampson and John Laub carried out a study on the “age-graded theory of informal social
control” 27 and examined factors affecting desistence and persistence of crime. 28 Some of
the key points affecting Sampson and Laub’s age-graded theory of informal social control
included:
•

“individual traits and childhood experiences;” 29

•

“[e]xperiences in young adulthood and beyond [that] can redirect criminal trajectories
or paths;” 30

•

“positive life experiences and relationships [that] can help a person become
reattached to society;” 31

•

“[p]ositive life experiences such as gaining employment, getting married, or joining
the military create informal social control mechanisms that limit criminal behavior
opportunities;” 32 and

26

LARRY J. SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 291.
Id. at 279.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
27
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•

“[a] vital feature that helps people desist from crime is ‘human agency’ or the
purposeful execution of choice and free will.” 33
These age-graded factors of informal social control illustrate the differentiation

between young adults and adults. These factors are affected by “[r]ecent social,
economic, and demographic changes [that] have afforded many youth a lengthened
transition to adulthood.” 34 Social markers that were traditionally attained in the late teens
and early twenties are occurring later. For example, extended educational careers have
delayed other social markers, such as work, marriage and childbearing. 35 Additionally,
“[a] declining fraction of young adults enters full-time work before their early 20s and an
increasing number do so only toward the end of their 20s.” 36 These types of social
attainments are important factors assisting maturation and instrumental in desistance
because they regulate young adults’ social behaviors. Consequently, some young adults
with socioeconomic problems or dysfunctional families are disproportionately affected
and therefore more vulnerable during the transition to adulthood. 37
“All over Europe, […] a prolongation of the transitional phase from youthfulness
to adulthood has gradually taken place […] and [t]he reasons for this are manifold.” 38 For
example, there are higher rates of unemployment and higher job qualifications and the
attainment of such skills delay youths’ entry into the work force and consequently their
financial independence. 39 “[T]hroughout Europe, with the exception of Finland, about
50% of 20 to 24 year-old young adults […] still live with their parents.” 40 Also, the
average age of marriage and the age of a mothers’ first birth has increased considerably. 41
This extended transition to adulthood also increases “[t]he mean age at which episodic
criminal behavior discontinues.” 42 With social markers occurring at later ages and in turn
33

Id. at 280.
Stephanie Cosner Berzin, Vulnerability in the transition to adulthood: Defining risk based on youth
profiles, 32 CHILD. YOUTH SERVICES REV. 487, 487 (2010).
35
Richard A. Settersten, Jr., Passages to Adulthood: Linking demographic change and human development,
23 EUR. J. POPULATION 251, 252 (2007).
36
Id.
37
Larry J. Siegel, supra note 16, at 273.
38
Dünkel & Pruin, Young adult offenders in the criminal justice systems of European countries, supra note
18, at 1557.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1566.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1568.
34
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delaying maturation it subsequently raises the age at which more young adults are likely
to desist from criminal activity. These socioeconomic cues may indicate a need for
European states to expand the juvenile jurisdiction or young adult category to include
young adults in their mid-twenties.
The point of differentiation between young adults and adults is complicated by
informal social controls that assist in decreasing the propensity to engage in youthful
criminal activity; however, “[i]n adulthood, people strengthen their ability to delay
gratification and forgo the immediate gains that law violations bring. They also start
wanting to take responsibility for their behavior and to adhere to conventional norms,
such as establishing long-term relationships and starting a family.” 43 Criminology
theories and crime statistics on young adults reiterate the need to find juvenile or criminal
justice measures that recognize the propensity for young adults to come in contact with
the law and how to appropriately adjudicate this age group based on their young adult
development. The criminology research on young adults’ propensity to engage in
criminal behavior is further explained by psychological and neurological findings.
B. Psychological and Neurological Findings on Young Adults
Discussions on psychological and neurological development are predominately discussed
in two phases: teenagers and adults, with minimal emphasis on the stage in between. A
rudimentary analysis of behavioral and neuroscience findings on young adult
development is insightful to understand how their developmental traits are more similar
to adolescents. The understanding of young adulthood is referenced in the logic behind
certain regional definitions of young adult and some European states’ jurisdictions
decisions to treat young adult offenders similarly to juveniles.
1. Young Adults’ Psychological Traits
For years, U.S. juvenile justice advocates have supported their arguments for a strict
interpretation of maintaining under 18 year olds within the juvenile jurisdiction, using
psychological and neurological research. The argument goes that juveniles’ youthful
evolving processes are deserving of remedial treatment, rehabilitation and immunity from
43

LARRY J. SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 53 (citation omitted).
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lifelong stigmas associated with disclosure of criminal histories, which can hinder
educational and employment attainment. The behavioral research behind these arguments
played a key role in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court case Roper v. Simmons,
which abolished the juvenile death penalty for offenders who were under the age of 18
years at the time of the offense. 44 The Court found three differences between juveniles
and adults that render them outside the scope of the harshest end-all of sanctions, the
death penalty. First, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions;” 45
secondly, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure;” 46 and lastly, “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed.” 47
These general theories on psychosocial maturity explain why adolescents and
young adults engage in criminal activity and eventually desist; moreover, these
behavioral theories provide explanations as to why juveniles and young adults are
afforded protections from certain adult criminal procedures and penalties. “Psychosocial
maturation […] [involves] increases in self-control, stronger resistance to peer influence,
and the willingness to forsake immediate gratification in order to achieve future goals.” 48
Psychologists Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman suggest that self-control is a
component of psychosocial maturation, and the foundation of desistance. 49 Similarly,
criminologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirshci also posit that the lack of selfcontrol is a main contributor to antisocial behavior. 50 This underscores the age-graded
theory of informal social control that as youths become more psychologically mature they
are less likely to behave in an antisocial manner. 51
44

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
Id. at 15.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 16.
48
Kathryn C. Monahan, Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Cauffman, & Edward P. Mulvey, Trajectories of
Antisocial Behavior and Psychosocial Maturity From Adolescence to Young Adulthood, 45(6)
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1654, 1654 (2009) [hereinafter Monahan et. al.] (citation omitted).
49
Id. at 1655.
50
Id.
51
Id.
45
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In a 2009 study, Kathryn Monahan et. al. examined psychosocial maturity,
specifically, impulse control, suppression of aggression, future orientation, consideration
of others, personal responsibility and resistance of peer influence among serious juvenile
offenders (14 to 22 years) and their ability to persist and desist from antisocial behavior
as they transitioned to adulthood. 52 The findings demonstrated that during the transition
to adulthood, desistance of antisocial behavior was achieved by gains of impulse control
and suppression of aggression. 53
Psychologist and researcher Terrie Moffitt has tested numerous hypotheses on
desistence in adolescence-limited offenders and life-course-persistent offenders over the
developmental phases to adulthood. One result has remained constant over her decades of
research and correlates with the age-crime theory: “[m]ost individuals who engage in
antisocial behavior in adolescence (regardless of when such behavior began) discontinue
it as they become adults, and only a small portion of deviant adolescents will develop into
deviant adults.” 54 This is an indication that young adult offenders behavior is changing
and effected by various developmental factors and social attainments.
As these psychological functions mature an overwhelming majority of young
adults desist and age out of behaviors that are likely to bring them into conflict with
criminal law. This developmental phase, which makes young adults susceptible to
influence, also makes them amenable to positive influences, change and more responsive
to rehabilitation than a developed adult. Furthermore, these behavioral traits have been
supported by neuroscience, which provides medical findings on the correlation of
emotional and cognitive reasoning to brain functions. In other words, neuroscience offers
a physiological explanation to the adolescent-like behaviors such as risk-taking and
impulsivity demonstrated by young adults.

52

Id. at 1654.
Id. at 1664.
54
Id. at 1656.
53
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2. Young Adults’ Neurological Functioning
Neuroscientists have linked young adults’ cognitive processes with brain function. 55
Developments in Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) have produced images showing
that brain structure and function continue developing into the twenties. 56 Research results
vary on the completion of these processes with estimations throughout the twenties. The
pre-frontal lobe, a section within the frontal lobe, is the epicenter of the brain’s cognitive
functions 57 for reasoning and judgment. 58 Developments within the pre-frontal cortex
effect self-reliance, susceptibility to peer influence and empathy; additionally, impulse
control and planning are correlated with the growth of the dorsolateral prefrontal and
parietal cortices areas of the brain. 59 According to some neuroscientists “cognitive
maturity, that is, the point where [brain] patterns indicate fully developed adult reasoning
and judgment may not occur until the mid-twenties.” 60 Myelination is the developing of
white matter that works as circuitry to provide efficient and precise brain operations; 61
and “many of the nerves connecting different processing centers in the brain don’t finish
myelinating until the early twenties.” 62
Studies of brain development show that brain volume, which reflects the
combination of white and gray matter, continues to increase until around
age twenty, and that the ratio of white to gray matter continues to change
at least into the mid-twenties, with later development for males than
females. Moreover, this research indicates that the development of
different parts of the brain occurs at different times. The last parts of the
brain to mature are the frontal lobes, regions of the brain associated with
planning, attention, and social interactions. 63
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Neurological studies on young adults received noteworthy reference in the
criminal case, Gall v. United States. The facts before the Supreme Court began when a
district court judge decided to sentence Gall, a young college student, to 36 months of
probation for distributing ecstasy as part of a drug conspiracy during his sophomore year
in college. 64 This was a diametric decision by the court compared to the prosecutor’s
suggestion, based on a pre-sentence report’s recommendation of a custodial sentence of
30 to 37 months. 65 The federal case was eventually appealed. “The Eighth Circuit
reversed [the district court’s decision] on the ground that a sentence outside the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines range must be – and was not in this case – supported by
extraordinary circumstances.” 66 In essence, the appeal court disbelieved that there were
circumstances justifying a substantially reduced sentenced. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and sided with the sentencing court. The
Court’s opinion underscored the district court judge’s views on the petitioner’s
development and maturity when considering its decision.
Recent studies on the development of the human brain conclude that
human brain development may not become complete until the age of
twenty-five… [T]he recent [National Institute of Health] report confirms
that there is no bold line demarcating at what age a person reaches full
maturity. While age does not excuse behavior, a sentencing court should
account for age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant. 67
The district judge’s decision to implement a probationary sentence, also hinged on
the cessation of Gall’s criminal behavior based on his post-offense conduct to lead a new
life; 68 therefore, the judge felt that “[a]ny term of imprisonment in this case would be
counter effective.” 69 The indictment in this case came about three and a half years after
Gall withdrew from the conspiracy70 and this allowed the court to examine a longer
period of Gall’s transition to adulthood. Gall’s post-offense behaviors outline his
achievement of social markers demonstrating maturation on the pathway to adulthood.
64
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For example, prior to joining the conspiracy Gall used marijuana, ecstasy and cocaine,
but discontinued drug use a few months after joining the conspiracy, and withdrew from
the conspiracy within six to seven months after joining. 71 Gall’s decisions to “lead a new
life” (prior to the indictment), included completing his college degree and becoming a
master carpenter. 72 While under indictment Gall started his own business in the
construction industry because he was free on his own recognizance. 73 The Gall case and
the rulings by the district judge and the Supreme Court, exemplify the research and
arguments sociologists, psychologists and neurologists have concluded about young
adults’ transitional phase to adulthood. It also highlights the importance of no pre-trial
detention and non-custodial sentences, either of which could have set Gall back from
educational and professional advancements during the case process.
According to author June Carbone, who discusses the affects of neuroscience
research in age related laws, agrees that the growing scientific research on brain
development is useful for understanding how societal changes affect different age
groups; 74 in particular, risk-taking in young adulthood. 75 She warns her audience about
the counter effects of using neuroscience as the sole reasoning for age based laws because
developmental neuroscience is limited by “its inability to inform individual assessment.
[For example,] [i]maging studies that show group trends in structural maturity – such as
relative levels of myelination in [the] prefrontal cortex – do not show that all individuals
in the group perfectly reflect the trend.” 76 This is an important point and reminder that
legal reform should not be based solely on neuroscience. Instead, it is important to view
the social and scientific discourses as a coalescence to provide well-rounded information
on young adulthood in order to develop criminal law reforms that are appropriate to the
dynamic developmental phase of young adult offenders between 18 and 24 years.
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II. Regional and European States’ Systems Recognizing Young Adults
A. European and Ibero-American Regions Consider Young Adults
Regionally, Europe and Ibero-America 77 have categorized young adults as those between
adolescence and adulthood. The Council of Europe, the European Union (EU) and the
Ibero-American Youth Rights Convention (IAYRC) recommend legal protections for
young adults, including young adult offenders. These documents explain why young
adults need particular rights and protections based on their unique transitional phase of
development.
In 2003 the Council of Europe recommended new methods for European juvenile
justice systems with Rec(2003)20, which suggests embracing young adults into the
juvenile jurisdiction. The Council defined juveniles as those who have reached the age of
criminal responsibility and are below the age of majority; 78 however, the term
“juveniles” may also include those immediately over the age of majority.78 The Council’s
language reflects the numerous legal systems differing ages of criminal responsibility and
age of majority, but it also signifies that those over the age of majority (which typically
marks the onset of adult responsibility) are welcomed within juvenile justice. The
Council based its proposition on including young adults within the juvenile jurisdiction
because “the age of legal majority does not necessarily coincide with the age of
maturity.” 79 This statement supports the social and neuroscientific discourses findings
that young adults are not necessarily mature adults. The Council proposed that
“[c]ulpability should better reflect the age and maturity of the offender, and be more in
step with the offender’s stage of development, with criminal measures being

77

See generally Reference.com, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Ibero-America (“IberoAmerica is a term which started to be used in the second half of the 19th century to refer collectively to the
countries in the Americas which were formerly colonies of Spain or Portugal. Spain and Portugal are
themselves included in some definitions, such as that of the Ibero-American Summit and the Organization
of Ibero-American States. The Organization of Ibero-American States also includes Equatorial Guinea,
in Central Africa, but not the Portuguese-speaking African countries.”).
78
Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning new
ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile justice, 853rd meeting, Rec(2003)20, at §
Definitions (Sept. 23, 2003).
79
Id. at ¶ 6.

16

progressively applied as individual responsibility increases.” 80 One response by the
Council was to use methods comparable to juvenile justice to adjudicate young adults. 81
The Council reasoned that the extended transition to adulthood impacted their
decision to recommend including young adults under 21 years within the juvenile
jurisdiction. They based this decision on criminological, psychological and sociological
research and changes in young adults’ lifestyles over the last 50 years. 82
Reflecting the extended transition to adulthood, it should be possible for
young adults under the age of 21 to be treated in a way comparable to
juveniles and to be subject to the same interventions, when the judge is of
the opinion that they are not as mature and responsible for their actions as
full adults. 83
Lastly, the Council duly considered the negative consequences of an adult
conviction for young European adults. The Council noted in order “[t]o facilitate […]
[young adults’] entry into the labour market, every effort should be made to ensure that
young adult offenders under the age of 21 should not be required to disclose their
criminal record to prospective employers, except where the nature of the employment
dictates otherwise.” 84
A more recent regional treaty on the liberties of young adults is the IAYRC,
which contains provisions on young adults that are not found in any other treaty. 85 “The
IAYRC builds on the […] [CRC] to extend legal protections beyond the age of 18 to
young adults.” 86 The IAYRC was developed for young people between 15 and 24
years. 87 This is an expansive age bracket that incorporates young adults between 18 and
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24 years. Unfortunately, its application is limited to “nationals or residents in any
Iberoamerican country.” 88
The IAYRC recognized similar conclusions about young adult development as the
Council of Europe. The Preamble of the IAYRC stated that psychosocial, physical and
identity traits categorized young people separately from adults. 89 These factors define the
“social sector” of young adults 90 as the phase “in which personality, acquisition of
knowledge, self-esteem and projection of future are formed and consolidated.” 91 The
Preamble also points out that young peoples’ development or “comprehensive
formation” 92 is jeopardized when they are deprived of certain rights like education,
employment, housing and health. 93
In terms of criminal justice the IAYRC requires state parties “to guarantee a legal
procedure which takes into account the young condition” 94 and “their age and the need to
promote their re-socialisation through alternative measures to the application of the
penalty.” 95 Furthermore, it calls for state parties, who prescribe death penalty sanctions,
to prohibit the death penalty for young people who were within the Convention’s
jurisdictional age at the time of the commission of the crime. 96 The IAYRC is the only
regional instrument to clearly demand protection from the stark recourse of adult criminal
law and sanctions on young adults.
The EU is also examining the role of young adults within its scheduled Human
Security doctrine, a name which presupposes an all-encompassing legislation on human
rights. The EU typically defines young adults as those aged 15 to 25years. 97 Author
Jenny Kuper reviewed the proposal of the doctrine and argued that young people, those
25 years and younger, should be a recognized age group within the proposed EU Security
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Doctrine. 98 Kuper believes the Human Security doctrine is relevant to young adults
because “[m]any of those affected by severe insecurity abroad are of course young, and
the majority of migrants into the EU are […] those aged 15-24 […] [and] many [are]
accused of ‘terrorism’ and involved in crime and trafficking.” 99 Kuper argues the age old
phenomenon that young people are the future and therefore the beneficiaries of current
human security protections. 100 A human security doctrine broadens the ideals of young
adults by recognizing the affects of conflict on their vulnerable developmental phase.
Europe and Ibero-America have raised awareness on young adulthood and young
adult offenders at the regional human rights level, but inclusion of young adults within
the universal system remains to be seen. It is within the European region that a majority
of states have taken initiative to categorize young adults separately from adults within the
criminal justice system.
B. European States Considering Young Adult Offenders
Certain European states have implemented legislation addressing the special
developmental phase of young adulthood and made concessions for this age group within
juvenile and criminal laws. Juvenile justice traditionally treats youth as a developing age
group with greater rehabilitation potential than adults.
The principal reason for a separate juvenile justice system is the idea that
educational measures are more appropriate than traditional punishment,
because young persons are in a stage of continuous personal development
where educational efforts are deemed a promising strategy. Therefore, in
all European countries juvenile legislation provides for special education
measures and sanctions in order to avoid compromising the developmental
process of young persons in the transitional stage from youthfulness to
adulthood. 101
Many European countries have raised the upper age limit of the juvenile
jurisdiction to include older populations of young adults. Even in Scandinavian countries,
98
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which do not have a juvenile justice system, 102 adolescents and young adults have been
segregated from adult criminal law with graded penal procedures and sentencing
schemes.
European juvenile justice researchers Frieder Dünkel and Ineke Pruin stress how
young adults are more similar to juveniles than adults 103 and that “young adult offenders
is one of the most important areas of juvenile justice reform in Europe as it influences the
scope of separate juvenile justice systems considerably.” 104 In their study, Dünkel and
Pruin reviewed 35 European legal systems and discovered a clear trend that more
European states are widening the scope of juvenile jurisdictions to accommodate young
adults. 105 Dünkel and Pruin recommend that countries change their legislations and
practice, so that young adult offenders receive alternatives to incarceration and
rehabilitative sanctions 106 – sentencing measures that are commonly associated with
juvenile justice. The authors allude in their recommendation that young adult offenders
are in a stage of development that also makes them more amenable to rehabilitation.
For young adults (as for juveniles) tentative/cautious penal interventions
with flexible, supportive and rehabilitative provisions are more advisable
than predominantly repressive measures with their known disintegrative
effects. Such an integrative approach will better promote the development
of an individual personal identity as well as the attainment of a certain
degree of stability, which results in the desistance from episodic criminal
behavior that is ‘typical for young people’. 107
Adjudicating young adults separately from adult offenders has been practiced for
over 50 years in countries such as Germany, while other countries have recently adopted
the practice. Reasons behind these legal implementations draw on theories about young
adults’ youthful stage of development and the negative impact of adult criminal
procedures on their developmental stage. Many of the European countries provide
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educational and rehabilitative sanctions within the juvenile justice system, 108 which has
grown to include a range of young adults from 18 to 25 years. There are multiple ways in
which young adult offenders have been considered within juvenile and criminal law. This
is achieved by 1) using a third category or jurisdiction that is separate from adult criminal
law; 2) including young adults within the juvenile jurisdiction; or 3) including young
adults within adult criminal law, but using age as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The
following European case examples provide state specific adjudication practices of young
adult offenders.
1. Germany
According to authors Dünkel and Pruin, “[t]he German legislation and practice is
probably the most far-reaching extension of the scope of juvenile justice to encompass
young adults in Europe.” 109 Approximately, two thirds of young German adult offenders
are sentenced as juveniles. 110 Germany’s progressive approach permits the juvenile
justice or adult criminal systems to determine young adults’ liability. 111 “Unlike the U.S.
system and other European countries, all individuals below 18 are strictly treated under
juvenile penal law [in Germany].” 112 Even those young adults who come into conflict
with the adult criminal system are overall treated in a less reprehensible manner than
compared to young adult offenders in the U.S., in part, because the German criminal
justice system is an “inquisitorial procedure” 113 rather than an “accusatory” 114 one.
In 2000 and 2006 the peak age of crime in Germany was around 25 years. 115
However, conviction rates demonstrate a slightly younger age range. From 1997 to 2007,
18 to 20 year olds had higher rates of conviction than 14 to 17 year olds or young adults
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over 21 years. 116 “Germany [tends to have] […] the lowest juvenile incarceration rate in
Europe, despite an increase in juvenile crime in Germany and public outcries against
leniency.” 117
Since 1953, the German system has included young adults between 18 and 21
years,

118

if they meet the following requirements under Section 105 of the Youth Courts

Law:
1. the overall assessment of the perpetrator’s personality, taking account of
his living environment, demonstrates that at the time of the act he was still
equivalent to a youth in terms of his moral and intellectual development,
or
2. the type, circumstances and motives of the act indicate that it
constituted youth misconduct. 119
Young adults whose maturity is doubted are by default often accepted into the
juvenile system due to a wide interpretation on the regulations applicable to young adults
by the courts. 120 For example,
[t]he Supreme Federal Court (‘Bundesgerichtshof’, BGH) held that a
young adult has the maturity of a juvenile if ‘elements demonstrate that a
considerable development of the personality is still to be seen’. This is the
case in the majority of young adult offenders. Thus the court does not rely
on an imaginative (prototype of) juvenile, but aspects of each individual’s
personal development. 121
German practice tends to rely on the least punitive options in the majority of
young adult cases and commonly errs on the side of fines over imprisonment to foster
young adults away from future contact with the law. The maximum penalty for youths
116
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under youth criminal law is ten years 122 and the maximum penalty for young adults under
general criminal law is ten to 15 years in place of life imprisonment. 123 In practice
“juvenile prosecutors, particularly in some Federal States, […] tend to apply the general
[adult] criminal law in cases of traffic offences that are usually sanctioned with fines.” 124
Albeit 90% of serious crimes, such as murder, rape, and robbery are sentenced under
juvenile law which protects young adults from longer adult sentences. 125 Adjudication of
young adults under juvenile law is beneficial because the juvenile court is familiar with
the educational and development needs of young people, and are much better equipped at
applying juvenile sanctions based on the offenders’ individual needs. 126
Young adults adjudicated within the juvenile jurisdiction are spared from certain
collateral consequences associated with adult convictions. For example, offenses are
stricken from young adults’ criminal records if resolved within the juvenile
jurisdiction. 127 “For offenses committed by children and young adults, only sentences of
two or more years are recorded in ‘certificates of good standing’.” 128 This allowance
protects young adults from future social exclusions and stigmas associated with criminal
convictions.
After extensive research on Germany’s juvenile justice system, Dünkel suggests
that the scope of the juvenile court should expand to incorporate those under 25 years. 129
However, in a later recommendation in 2009, Dünkel and Junger-Tas reference
neurological and psychological findings on maturation and suggest a more conservative
age range of 18 to 21 years for the age of criminal majority. 130 However, Dünkel’s initial
suggestion to include those under 25 years is in line with many other studies on
psychological and neurological development on young adults; thus, his initial
122
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recommendation should be re-examined. Dünkel’s initial suggestion allows for a larger
range of developing young adults into the juvenile jurisdiction, while courts retain the
judicial discretion to choose between juvenile and adult criminal law to find the best
means of rehabilitating young adult offenders.
2. Austria
The Austrian juvenile jurisdiction applies to all offenders between 14 and 18 years. 131
The Federal Act of Austria was amended in 2001 132 to introduce “young adults” – those
under 21 years at the time of the alleged criminal act – into national legislation. 133 The
Austrian legislation was concerned with certain criminal procedures negative effects on
youth development, and resolved this conflict by creating a special jurisdiction to adjudge
young adults. 134 This jurisdiction for young adults maintains certain qualities of the
juvenile system such as limiting the use of pre-trial detention based on the rule of
proportionality. 135 Furthermore, young adults are allowed
the right to the presence of a person in the position of trust when being
interrogated by police; the prohibition of trials in absentia; a limited right
to demand a trial with the public excluded; and the rule that special
juvenile investigations shall help finding out about the individual
circumstances relevant to the judgement about the social, psychological
and physical situation of the suspected guilty person. 136
The age of the young adult (between 18 and 21 years) is recognized as a
mitigating circumstance in sentencing. 137 Young adults are not sentenced to life
imprisonment and the maximum confinement sentence is 20 years. 138 There is also
limited disclosure of criminal records for young adults. Young adults, who committed
crimes while under 21 years and who were sentenced up to 360 day fines and/or prison

131

Frank Hӧpfel, Austria: Criminal Responsibility of Minors, 75 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 121, 129 (2004).
Id. at 127.
133
Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. (citation omitted).
137
Id. at 131.
138
Id. at 130-131.
132

24

term of up to six months, criminal records are only disclosed to police, prosecutors and
courts. 139
3. Switzerland
“In Switzerland young adults can be treated like juveniles until they are 25.” 140 The
Swiss system is similar to Germany’s treatment of young adults in that it allows courts to
choose between juvenile and adult criminal law. The determination for juvenile
adjudication in Switzerland is “dependent on the existence of specific preconditions. For
instance, there is often the requirement for a predictive assessment of the effectiveness of
the applicable sanctions in order to determine whether adult or juvenile criminal law is to
be applied.” 141
4. Scandinavian Countries
The Scandinavian countries do not have a juvenile system, but maintain a second
category for juveniles and young adults, which vary from 15 to 21 years. 142 The purpose
of this second or “intermediate legislation” is to separate youth from adult offenders and
adult criminal law. 143 The adult criminal sentencing codes in Sweden and the Netherlands
demonstrate how flexible responses to young adult offenders are capable of existing
within adult criminal law. 144
The Netherlands’ courts assess whether or not a young adult should be
adjudicated under the juvenile or adult penal system based on preconditions or an
assessment of the relative sanctions. 145 Young adults, 18 to 21 years, are applicable under
juvenile law if the personality of the offender or the facts of the case are similar to a
juvenile. 146 Professor Doreleijers, a child psychiatrist in the Netherlands, argues for
139
140
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young adults, aged 23 and younger, to receive childhood protections and treatment as
juveniles, since most of the accused in the Netherlands are between 18 and 23 years of
age and there behaviors resemble juveniles, not adults. 147
In Sweden offenders under the age of 18 are categorized separately from young
adults between the ages of 18 and 20. 148 Swedish law does not include young adults
within the juvenile jurisdiction. Instead, the legislation found other ways to relieve young
adults from full adult criminal liability with graded sentencing schemes. Those under 21
years are immune from life imprisonment 149 and mandatory minimum sentences can be
disregarded, 150 instead fines and imprisonment are stratified according to the offenders’
age. 151 Factors used in deciding penalties are “the penal value, previous criminality,
equity reasoning, and the age of the offender at the time of the offence.” 152 In order to
determine the penal value of the case, criminal conduct of the minor or young adult must
demonstrate a “lack of development, experience, or capacity for judgement.” 153
Graded sentencing is used with fines and custodial sanctions. For example, day
fines for 15 to 17 year olds are reduced to half the amount applied for 21 year olds, and
fines for 18 to 20 year olds are reduced to two thirds the amount for 21 year olds. 154
Custodial sentences are also graded based on age. “[I]f the offender at the time of the
offence was 15 years, the prison term is one fifth of the normal term; at 16 years, one
fourth; at 17 years, one third; at 18 years, half; at 19 years, two thirds; at 20 years, three
quarters.” 155 Moreover, offenders who committed a crime before the age of 21 are
immune from life imprisonment sentences. 156
Finland also has special age based practices for youth serving confinement
sentences. All offenders who were under 21 years at the time of the crime are treated as
147
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juveniles within the prison system. 157 The Finish law holds similar reasoning to other
domestic jurisdictions that this age group needs special care during imprisonment
because of their age and development. 158
5. Greece
In Greece young adults are adjudicated under adult criminal law; however, the court
considers the young adult offenders age as a mitigating circumstance in determining the
type and length of the sentence. 159 Offenders who were 18 to 20 years at the time of the
offense are subject to the mitigated sentencing provisions found in Article 83 of the
Greek Criminal Code. 160
These state based practices of young adult offenders provides a brief synopsis of
the various age parameters defining young adult offenders and the methods available to
protect young adults from full adult criminal procedures and sentencing.
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III. Young Adults in International Law and the U.S. Legal System
International human rights law designed age-based criteria to protect the vulnerable stage
of childhood 161 and it generally relies on the universalist Straight 18 approach as the
bright line between children and adults, while ignoring the category of young adults. U.S.
criminal law follows a parallel approach, with the exception of some under 18 years who
are eligible for transfer from the juvenile jurisdiction to the adult criminal system.
This article’s purpose is to raise awareness for legal recognition of young adults
and more specifically for young adult offenders between 18 and 24 years; however, there
are downfalls of age-based criteria. Age-based criteria undermines individual assessment,
creates limitations and presents anomalies across legal discourses, yet age markers are
frequently used in a world reliant on law to define terms. Age criteria can compromise
other age based rights by creating inconsistent age limits, an inflexible approach and
contradictory laws. 162 Such arguments about paradoxical age based laws are present
within international human rights law, specifically, international criminal law which
attempts to work within the human rights agenda to address criminal liability within
conflict and post-conflict situations; and similar age-based anomalies are present in U.S.
law, as well. This section highlights the influence of the Straight 18 approach within
international human right law, which has championed rules on international juvenile
justice and affected the system of international criminal law. This section closes with an
analysis of the U.S. system which has similarly ignored the importance of young
adulthood, and failed to account for this age category within criminal law.
A. Young Adults within International Standards on Juvenile Justice
Where regional human rights systems and certain European states’ penal systems have
afforded young adults provisions based on their age and maturity, the international legal
system has not taken a prevalent stance on the category of young adults, despite their
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growing population within the global community. 163 Much of the international discussion
on “age-hoods” has been situated within children’s rights and juvenile justice. While
juvenile law is one of the ways in which young adult offenders can be included into a
system more in line with their development, there is little discussion about this within
international human rights.
The “Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the cornerstone for
children’s rights around the world, detailing the moral claims to which children are
entitled both as people and because of their special status.” 164 The CRC defines anyone
under the age of 18 years as a child 165 and reiterates the Straight 18 approach. By default
those over 18 years are adults, with no mention of a young adulthood category. As one of
the most influential documents defining “age-hoods” the CRC has created an epoch for
children and juveniles, but on the contrary it has ignored the similar youthful
characteristic of young adults.
Philip Veerman, a psychologist and expert on juvenile courts, has criticized the
CRC as an outdated document that does not reflect the quickly changing modern world or
current reflections of childhood. 166 Veerman argues that Article 1 of the CRC needs to be
reviewed because of new findings from neuroscience, which argues for childhood
protection until the age of 24 years. 167 Today, young people behave as adults,
particularly, in their access to technology, but this does not mean that they know how to
make the right choice. 168 Veerman states that “it is time to […] find remedies for where
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child does not give protection to children.” 169
One of these remedies could be redefining the age parameters of the child to include an
older population of young adults. This would require a revision of Article 1 to include
those under 25 years. A second option to include young adults within international human
rights law would be the creation of a young adult treaty, similar to the IAYRC.
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In 2007, the Committee on the Rights of the Child issued a General Comment
expanding on children’s rights under the juvenile justice heading. The Committee
reiterated its position that “[c]hildren differ from adults in their physical and
psychological development, and their emotional and educational needs. Such differences
constitute the basis for the lesser culpability of children in conflict with the law.” 170
The Committee […] recommends that those States parties which limit the
applicability of their juvenile justice rules to children under the age of 16
(or lower) years, or which allow by way of exception that 16 or 17-yearold children are treated as adult criminals, change their laws with a view to
achieving a non-discriminatory full application of their juvenile justice
rules to all persons under the age of 18 years. 171
In essence the Committee reiterated its desire for states to maintain juvenile justice
systems based on the Straight 18 approach. However, the Committee also expressed its
“appreciation that some States parties allow for the application of the rules and
regulations of juvenile justice to persons aged 18 and older, usually till the age of 21.” 172
This comment insinuates that the Committee recognizes offenders between 18 and 21
years would be better served in the juvenile jurisdiction than the adult criminal system.
In 1965, the Third United Nations Congress analyzed criminality and social
change. 173 The United Nations Congress considered “[s]pecial preventive and treatment
measures for young adults,” under which it discussed at length the definition of ‘young
adult’ offender.” 174 At that period in time the United Nations Congress found two
categories of age criteria for young adults: firstly, the range was “the upper age limit for
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juvenile delinquents (usually between 15 and 18 years) to a maximum of 21 years;” 175 or
secondly, young adults between 15 and 17 years. 176
The United Nations Congress noted that most countries defined young adults
“either by statute or some other means.” 177 The “other means” of defining this age group
developed from a variety of sources such as tradition, physiological maturity, cultural
expectation, and social and economic responsibility. 178 Ideas about a Straight 18
approach were weak at this time, and in fact, a Straight 24 approach received much praise
as the way forward.
The Third Congress concluded that ‘the trend seemed to be toward a
raising of the upper age limit to 24 years’. Moreover, ‘the traditional
institutional approach to the treatment of young adult offenders was
consistently and strongly criticized and emphasis was placed on devising
methods which could resolve the young adults’ delinquency problems
within the community’. Non-institutional treatment was to be given
preference. 179
In 1975, The Fifth United Nations Congress focused on criminality in terms of
development and “noted that ‘special attention should be paid to the factors contributing
to the violent behavior of many young persons in various parts of the world, and, in
particular, to the extent to which this behavior, in its myriad manifestations, reflected a
failure or absence of youth policies’.” 180
In a recommendation by the World Congress of the International Congress on
Criminal Law, members offered reasons for the exclusion of young adults from full adult
criminal responsibility.
The participants of the 17th World Congress of the International Congress
on Criminal Law in 2002, considered that: … the state of adolescence can
be prolonged into young adulthood (25 years) and that, as a consequence,
legislation needs to be adapted for young adults in a similar manner as it
175
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is done for minors. In particular the Congress resolved that: The
administration of educational measures or alternative sanctions that focus
on rehabilitation may be extended, at the demand of the concerned
individual, to the age of 25. 181
In 1985, the international community encouraged young adults’ inclusion into the
juvenile category through soft law. Rule 3.3 of the Beijing Rules states that “[e]fforts
shall also be made to extend the principles embodied in the Rules to young adult
offenders.” 182 The deficit with Rule 3.3 lies in the absence of a definition of “young adult
offender” and it also does not provide guidance as to an acceptable age range or
conservative age range for young adult offenders. Instead, the Beijing Rules rely on
states’ parties to define these terms and set age parameters. The reluctance to define
young adults resembles a similar instance in the Beijing Rules attempt to define juvenile.
The Beijing Rules Commentary stated:
it should be noted that age limits will depend on, and are explicitly made
dependent on, each respective legal system, thus fully respecting the
economic, social, political, cultural, and legal systems of Member States.
This makes for a wide variety of ages coming under the definition of
‘juvenile’ ranging from 7 years to 18 years or above. 183
The Beijing Rules conservative attempt to recognize young adult offenders in
Rule 3.3 and its reference in the Commentary to include those “18 years or above” within
the term “juvenile” demonstrates a subtle initiative by the international community to
recommend the inclusion of young adults within juvenile justice. Meanwhile, there is
currently no indication of the anticipated Straight 24 approach emerging within
international human rights law.
B. Age-based Anomalies in International Criminal Law
International human rights’ definition of children and juveniles has impacted the more
recent discourse of international criminal law. International criminal law is a response to
181
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human rights violations often committed during civil or international conflicts. Today,
these conflicts have grown to include young adults. “An estimated 300,000 young
soldiers, most of who are between the ages of 10 and 24, currently risk their lives in the
course of armed conflicts.” 184 Such conflicts foster situations for young adults to
potentially come into contact with international criminal law. For the purpose of this
analysis of international criminal law, juveniles and young adults will be discussed within
the jurisdictions of international tribunals and international courts and the core
international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. 185
According to author Jenny Kuper young people are a vulnerable group “who are
also prone to being coerced into becoming combatants or otherwise participating in
armed conflict.” 186 Developmental factors of impressionability and vulnerability in young
adults is not limited to participation in street crimes, but also evident in their participation
in conflict, since young adults “often play a significant role as actors in situations of
conflict and post-conflict.” 187 Any actions amounting to international crimes could bring
lawful or unlawful young adult combatants within the jurisdiction of international
criminal law.
In constructing the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC) chose to
exclude those under 18 years at the time of the alleged crime from their jurisdiction. 188
The ICC’s Straight 18 approach to indict individuals 18 years and older upholds the
demarcation set by international human rights law and the neighboring CRC. The ICC’s
jurisdiction also reiterates the age-based line between juvenile justice and adult criminal
liability; therefore, according to the Straight 18 approach the Court’s jurisdiction is
centered on adult criminal liability. The ICC decision not to involve the court in juvenile
justice matters may be a result or combination of the following arguments. Firstly, “that
international crimes have such onerous mens rea requirements that children will always
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lack capacity to commit them.” 189 Secondly, children often assume a dual role as victims
and offenders. Thirdly, “[p]rosecuting minors would have required the provision of a
special regime [(statute and court)] and was not a sensible use of the court’s slender
resources.” 190 Lastly, “there is a high degree of national variation in assessing when a
child reaches the age at which they are mature and should be criminally responsible;” 191
thus, respecting sovereignty of domestic jurisdictions 192 ability to prosecute minors for
international crimes. 193
The Rome Statue has contributed to the list of contradictions about age-based
laws and children. For example, Article 8 undermines the idea of childhood by defining
only those under 15 years as children exempt from conscription or enlistment into states’
armies and their active participation in hostilities; 194 meaning any person who is 18 years,
including young adults, who recruited a child under 15 years is liable for war crimes
under the Court’s jurisdiction. It has been proposed “that the ICC should […] raise the
legal age of child recruitment, enlisting or “use” from fifteen to eighteen.” 195 This
maneuver would enhance protection from taking part in conflict for under 18 year olds
and it would obviously not affect the current situation for young adults’ ability to come
into contact with international criminal law. Such a decision by the ICC to raise the age
of recruitment to 18 years, creates future anomalies within international human rights law
to redefine the term “child” and the juvenile jurisdiction to include those beyond 18
years. However, the current utilization of the Straight 18 approach creates potential for
opening a third category to adjudicate young adult offenders separately from adults
within the ICC.
Inconsistencies on the definition of “children” and “juvenile” stem from state
parties sovereign decisions on the age of conscription, and also state parties ability to

189

Matthew Happold, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law 2, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski,
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
190
ROBERT CRYER ET. AL., supra note 185, at 137.
191
David M. Rosen, supra note 2, at 113.
192
Id.
193
ROBERT CRYER, ET. AL., supra note 185, at 137.
194
Rome Statute, supra note 188, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
195
THE REDRESS TRUST, VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS OR HEROES? CHILD SOLDIERS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2006).

34

criminalize non-state actors for recruitment. 196 “Humanitarian and human rights groups
have been successful in preventing the prosecution of any child soldier under age
eighteen.” 197 Thus, human rights groups have not advocated on the behalf of young adult
offenders accused of human rights violations amounting to international crimes.
Generally, juveniles have been regarded as children and protected from
international tribunals. “The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not include any provisions governing the age of
criminal responsibility and neither tribunal has indicted any person below the age of
eighteen.” 198 In defining the age of criminal responsibility at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL), “[t]he non-governmental organizations’ strategy was to prevent holding
anyone under age eighteen judicially accountable. 199 In the end, SCSL had jurisdiction of
those 15 years and over. 200 However, the SCSL was definitive in their decision to exclude
those under 18 years from prosecution. “[T]he Prosecutor stated that, as a matter of
policy, he did not intend to indict persons for crimes committed when children.” 201
Additionally, the SCSL did not include life sentences 202 in their statute signaling the
desire for rehabilitation and re-entry for all offenders, including young adults.
Curiously, the defendant information of those currently indicted by the ICC
support the notion that the handful of defendants are well into their adult years. 203 Among
the international scene of tribunals the composition of defendants also appears to be
seasoned adults with extensive work histories in government and military; however, there
are a few tribunal cases of young adult offenders. The International Criminal Tribunal of
196
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Rwanda’s (ICTR) youngest defendant, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, 204 was approximately
27 years old at the time of his arrest for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations
of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. 205 As of
May 2011 this case had not reached a judgment. 206
In a notable decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Court used age as a mitigating factor in sentencing for one of its
young adult offenders. Defendant Esad Landžo, was arrested in 1996, at the age of 23
years. 207 He was found guilty on 17 counts for three murders, torture, causing great
suffering or serious injury and inhumane conditions 208 while working as a prison guard at
the Čelebići prison-camp. 209 At sentencing the Trial Chamber found:
While we have dismissed his defence of diminished responsibility, we have
noted his young age at the relevant time and his impressionability and
immaturity, as well as his particular personality traits and the effect that
the armed conflict in his home town had upon him. It is these factors
which have led us to impose a less severe sentence than the seriousness
and cruelty of his crimes would ordinarily require. The Trial Chamber
does not, however, accept that Mr. Landzo was the mere instrument of his
superiors, lacking the ability to exercise independent will.210
The Landžo case is an extreme example of a young adult who committed violent
international crimes. Landžo was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, 211 yet the Court’s
decision to recognize Landžo’s age and immaturity within the context of the crime and
account for this in sentencing is remarkable. The Court’s decision also references points
204
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made by social and scientific discourses on young adulthood (i.e. impressionability and
immaturity). Lastly, its decision reflects certain domestic legal practices that use age as a
mitigating factor at sentencing for young adult offenders.
1. The Straight 18 Approach of International Criminal Law
Influenced by the Laws of War
The Straight 18 approach has influenced the age of adult criminal responsibility within
international criminal law, yet the approach is actually rooted in the classical debate on
children’s roles in war. The following discussion centers on a younger age group of
actors in war (between 15 and 18 years), but its review is noteworthy since humanitarian
and human rights law collaborated to define the roles of children in war. The results of
these debates were impressed upon the later discourse of international criminal law;
meanwhile, ignoring the prevalence of young adults in conflict situations or
foreshadowing their potential criminal liability for breaches of laws regulating war.
“Advocates of the Straight-18 position have […] helped shape a wide variety of
treaties that call for restrictions on the use of child soldiers as part of a more general
recognition of children’s rights.” 212 This “universalist approach perceives all under-18
recruitment into armed groups as offensive.” 213 Nonetheless, the Straight 18 approach
defining children was compromised within a few international treaties.
There is, however, an ironic consequence to the disagreement over the age
at which a person is no longer considered to be a child: under international
humanitarian law, children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen can be
lawfully recruited to be soldiers under the same terms and conditions as
adults. However, unlike adults, if they commit war crimes they are not
subject to international criminal prosecution because of their age. 214
The 1977 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols were the “first attempt to
indirectly introduce the Straight-18 position into the laws of war.” 215 “[T]he drafters
hoped that the prohibition on child soldiers could ultimately be broadened beyond this
212

David M. Rosen, supra note 2, at 96.
Mary-Jane Fox, Child Soldiers and International Law: Patchwork Gains and Conceptual Debates, 7(1)
HUM. RTS. REV. 27, 42 (2005).
214
David M. Rosen, supra note 2, at 84.
215
Id. at 96.
213

37

age [of 18 years],” but similar to the speculated trend of a Straight 24 approach in
criminal law, this too, has not come to fruition.
Since the drafting of the 1977 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols
humanitarian and human rights ideals have diverged on defining children, specifically,
the age of recruitment by states’ armies. 216 One of the most contentious debates during
the drafting of the CRC was over “the age in which children should be permitted to take
part in armed conflict.” 217 Non-governmental organizations and many governments were
against under 18 years taking part in direct hostilities, even if states could recruit 15 years
and over into their militaries. 218 There were also other states, most notably the U.S.,
which refused to give protection to 15 to 17 year olds. 219 In the end, the opposing parties
were in essence agreeing on 15 years. “[S]ince there was no consensus on the upper age
limit and no delegation was arguing for an age-limit under fifteen,” 220 the debate was
closed and never reopened due to concerns that a review of Article 38 would raise
debates on many other articles. 221 It was determined then that Article 38 would prevent
those under 15 years from taking part in direct hostilities and recruitment into states’
armies. 222
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRCAC) also defines ages of certain
military involvements. The CRCAC prohibits signatory states armed forces from
allowing those below 18 years to take part in direct hostilities 223 and prohibits states’
parties from compulsory recruiting those below 18 years into their armed forces. 224 “The
main purpose of the CRCAC was to modify Article 38 of the CRC by raising the
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minimum age of military involvement to eighteen.” 225 On the contrary, the Geneva
Conventions Additional Protocols I and II prevent the use of children under the age of 15
years from recruitment and participation in hostilities, 226 but it does not prevent those
between 15 and 17 years from certain forms of military service. 227 This gap designed by
human rights and humanitarian laws creates a category of children vulnerable to military
involvement. The use of children in armed forces undermines children’s rights, the
purpose of the CRC and the Straight 18 position. It also invokes a false sense of maturity
associated with those under 18 years; and upsets categories of children and young adults
when adolescents – a younger age group – can lawfully partake in states’ armies,
responsibilities that appear more appropriate for adults than adolescents.
The paradoxes of age criteria in international human rights law – and its relative
discourses of international criminal law and children’s roles in war – resemble similar
age-based anomalies created by U.S. law.
C. The Situation for Young Adult Offenders in U.S. Law 228
Young adult development is situated between a teen and an adult, yet in the U.S., this
group is treated by criminal courts in a parallel manner to adult offenders, with some
offenders under 18 years transferred to adult courts. The concern about what to do with
young adult offenders is triggered by the appalling number of detainees in the U.S. 229
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“More than 9.8 million people are held in penal institutions throughout the world, mostly
as pre-trial detainees (remand prisoners) or as sentenced prisoners.” 230 More specifically,
as of March 2010, the U.S. accounted for 2.29 million prisoners, 231 around a quarter of
the world’s prison population, which “costs billions of dollars each year.” 232 These gross
statistics beg the question, is mass incarceration in the U.S. unnecessarily confining
young adult offenders who would be better rehabilitated in a non-custodial setting? Could
reform redirect a majority of young adult offenders to non-custodial sanctions, which
might then decrease the U.S.’s egregious number of prisoners? Prison reform advocates
would argue that certain offenders should not be held in pre-trial detention or sentenced
to imprisonment, and the same is true of some types of offenses, like drug possession, or
other forms of non-violent crimes. This argument could be applied to young adults as
certain offenders who are better served by non-confinement because of their
developmental stage, traits which also make young adults likely candidates for
rehabilitation. The methods in which these non-confinement sentences and other
reductions in adult criminal procedures could be attained is by drawing from
recommendations by the IAYRC and practices used in Europe: by either expanding the
juvenile jurisdiction to include young adult offenders under the age of 25, or creating a
third category for young adult offenders between 18 and 24 years that uses a lesser form
of criminal procedures and sanctions than adult criminal law.
The current situation of the U.S. criminal justice system’s reliance on
incapacitation, anomalies in general age-based criteria, varying ages of criminal
responsibility and a juvenile justice system that is not up to international standards poses
challenges for alternative methods to adjudicating young adult offenders. In particularly,
juvenile justice has acquired certain procedures of adult criminal law and juveniles can be
transferred to the adult system. The lack of a true juvenile justice system poses challenges
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to then either expand the delinquent system to include young adults; or allow for the
creation of a third category, since the juvenile system lacks a clear cut Straight 18
approach to adjudge all those under 18 years within its jurisdiction.
1. Arbitrary Age Criteria within General Laws and Regulations
In the U.S. many teenagers eagerly await their eighteenth birthday because this date
traditionally marks the passage to adulthood, symbolizing the beginning of adult
freedoms and citizenship responsibilities. Adult society reflects this view in the
adaptation of state and federal laws allocating the “age of majority” 233 or age based
liberties. The most historical age based law is found in the 26th Amendment, which gives
those 18 years and older the right to vote. 234 Common law practice set the age of majority
at 21 years, but now it is set by states’ statutes and most states have chosen 18 years as
the age of majority. 235 Eighteen also marks participation in other adult practices, such as
military, jury duty, nicotine purchase and pornography and does not necessarily
correspond with the age of majority. 236
However, 18 years does not mark a complete rite of passage to all adult freedoms.
Depending on state laws, alcohol use is prohibited until 21 years. In order to be elected as
a member in the House of Representatives individuals must be 25 years or older 237 and
30 years to be a senator. 238 The private sector also sets age restrictions, car rental
agencies have varying minimum ages of renters, usually 18 or 21 years, and many require
a surcharge for drivers under 25. 239 Similar fee increases are used amongst car insurance
companies, which charge higher premiums for teens and young adult drivers. The
anomaly of such age based criteria is that the physical, psychological and social
transformations from youth to adult are not completed at a specified age and vary
233
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amongst young adults. While many rights are reserved for those 18 years and over,
criminal law has made exceptions for those under 18 years and forced adult consequences
upon a young age group that is clearly not adult.
2. Negative Consequences for Young Adults in Contact with U.S.
Criminal Law
Young adults not only make up a significant portion of arrests, 240 but also a significant
portion of sentencing and incarceration rates. The age category of young adults continues
to be a particular interest to criminal statisticians studying conviction rates. In a 2004
study by the U.S. Department of Justice on state felony convictions, 20 to 29 year olds
comprised the largest age group at sentencing, around 40%; whereas, under 20 year olds
was 7% and 30 to 39 years was 27%. 241 In 2008, approximately 244,700 young adults
between the ages of 18 and 24, out of approximately 1,540,100 inmates, were detained by
state and federal corrections. 242 This is approximately 15%

243

of the adult prisoner

population. These statistics do not provide a complete perspective on incarceration rates
and recidivism since they fail to reference the number of prisoners with prior convictions
and confinement sentences received as young adults, factors contributing to recidivism.
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It is unsurprising that those with a prior confinement sentence are more likely to
be incarcerated again either as young adults or as adults. “The more prior incarceration
experiences inmates have, the more likely they are to recidivate (and return to prison)
within 12 months of their release.” 244 “Of those recently released, nearly two-thirds will
be charged with new crimes, and more than 40 percent will return to prison within three
years.” 245 Decreasing the use of non-custodial sentences for certain offenses and
offenders could decrease the U.S. prison population, and would not necessarily increase
crime. A similar result occurred in Germany. For example, in the 1980s Germany
decreased its prison population when it implemented non-custodial sentences more
frequently in youth law. 246 The U.S. has also experienced a correlation with stable or
lower levels of crime and lower levels of incarceration.
Many states have lowered their incarceration rates and still experienced a
drop in crime. Between 1998 and 2007, states that had the greatest
increases in incarceration rates did not necessarily see a corresponding
drop in crime rates. In some states, the opposite was true: they reduced
their incarceration rates and their crime rates fell. 247
The affects of criminal court procedures on young adults begins at arraignment, or
first court appearance. If the young adult is remanded, or cannot afford bail, then they
remain in custody until they are able to pay the bail fee or the case is resolved. Pre-trial
detention is the first interruption of the young adult offender’s life. Pre-trial detention is
not geared to rehabilitate offenders, since they have not been convicted, but it is the break
in education, work and familial responsibilities and confinement with more experienced
criminals.
If convicted and imprisoned then life course maturation is handicapped for longer
periods, and the opportunities to develop and expand skills are hampered by the prison
system. In the U.S.’s state prisons, the median length of imprisonment is approximately
244
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28 months. 248 This is a substantial amount of time for a young person to be absent from
school and work. Custodial facilities attempt to provide basic education qualifications
which are important for young adults’ life course. “[M]ore than half of all inmates
participate in some additional schooling while in prison, with over a quarter completing
their GED [General Equivalency Diploma].” 249 The options for education beyond a GED
are less available, but important to development and the acquisition of skills. Very few
prisons offer inmates access to college education courses. If courses are available then
someone from the outside must pay the inmate’s tuition. Since inmates are unemployed
and many come from impoverished backgrounds, or do not have a long enough work
history and savings to afford tuition they are unable to afford education in prison or soon
after re-entry.
Once released, former young adult offenders face new sets of challenges from
their convictions within the U.S. First, an adult criminal record is a public document and
“can be widely accessed by prospective employers, landlords, and creditors.” 250 This
public document follows the young adult throughout the rest of their life. Society expects
ex-offenders to become productive citizens upon release, but once released social
exclusions based on the criminal conviction reduce chances for former prisoners to
become self-reliant. Many state and federal laws prevent those with convictions from
accessing student loans for higher education, jobs, housing, and mental health and
substance abuse services. 251 The collateral consequences stemming from a conviction can
be devastating to young adults’ transition to adulthood and affect opportunities in
adulthood.
3. Varying Ages of Criminal Responsibility in the U.S.
The U.S. criminal justice system is applied at the federal and state levels; and juveniles
and young adults can come into conflict with either, with no inclusion of a young adult

248

DEVAH PAGER, supra note 245, at 30.
Id. at 32 (citation omitted).
250
Id. at 58.
251
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 247, at 8.
249

44

category for those between 18 and 24 years. 252 The division between federal and state
liability is as follows:
Under the U.S. Constitution, the power to impose criminal liability is
reserved primarily to the states, with federal authority limited to the
prohibition and punishment of those unusual crimes specially related to
federal interests […]. The vast bulk of most crimes and essentially all
‘street’ crimes—homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and theft—fall under
jurisdiction of one of the fifty state criminal codes or the code of the
District of Columbia. 253
U.S. federal laws do not provide a minimum age limit to adjudicate juveniles as
delinquent, 254 but the U.S.’s criminal code chapter on juvenile delinquency describes an
upper age limit for juveniles. The upper age limit of juvenile law creates a demarcation
between juvenile and adult federal criminal liability.
[A] ‘juvenile’ is a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or
for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an
alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his
twenty-first birthday, and ‘juvenile delinquency’ is the violation of a law
of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult or a violation by
such a person of section 922(x). 255
States have their own statutes for juveniles and adults who are in conflict with
state laws. Each state has jurisdiction over “which children are eligible for the juvenile
justice system, which will be sent to the adult criminal justice system, and, […] [s]tates
may set different ages for a child’s entry in to the juvenile system (as young as seven, as
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old as ten) or exit from the system (as young as sixteen, as old as twenty-five).” 256 In 31
states, and the District of Columbia, there is either no minimum age for the juvenile
jurisdiction or no minimum age of adult criminal responsibility. 257 In theory, the absence
of age criteria could allow court’s discretion to choose between the two systems, but it
also allows younger offenders who should be judged as juveniles to be tried as adults.
State and federal laws have yet to address young adults who make up a
considerable percentage of arrests and convictions by incorporating this age group within
the juvenile practice or creating a third category. In the U.S. young adults are not immune
from death penalty or life without parole sentences since they are considered adults under
criminal law. However, the State of Florida has implemented sentencing guidelines and
correctional procedures for young adult offenders (between 18 and 21 years).
4. The U.S. Juvenile Justice System
A review of the U.S. juvenile justice system is necessary to understand how its age
parameters have been modified to include those under the international Straight 18
approach within adult criminal law; and the background is useful for understanding how
the U.S. could expand juvenile law to include those under 25 years or create a third
category for young adult offenders.
The U.S.’s juvenile justice system was designed to address delinquent behavior
by children and teens, while reserving general criminal law for adults. The juvenile
justice system is primarily legislated by the 50 federated states and the District of
Columbia. 258 Juvenile laws are remarkably different than criminal laws since youths are
accused of delinquent acts rather than criminal offenses. 259 When the first juvenile court
opened in 1899 the purpose “was to investigate the factors that caused youths to go astray
and then devise a package of sanctions and services that would set them back on the right
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track.” 260 The intention of the juvenile justice system was to treat infractions by youths in
judicial-like settings “designed to recognize the special needs and immature status of
young people and to therefore emphasize rehabilitation over punishment.” 261
Experts in neuroscience, social science and psychology agree that the
same immaturity and flexibility that make teenagers more susceptible to
outside influences also make them strong candidates for rehabilitation.
Many studies show that adolescents are more capable of rehabilitation
than adults, either as a result of natural maturation or through the
intervention of criminal justice sanctions. 262
Over the last few decades, juvenile justice advocates have relied on social and
scientific research in arguing that children and teens are not fully developed adults and
therefore, deserve procedural methods and sanctions relevant to their level of functioning.
Recent advances in social and scientific research have expanded their initial findings
among children and teens to include young adults. These results on young adult
development subsequently warrant young adults’ similar differential treatment from adult
offenders – an age old line of reasoning and practice amongst certain European states
which include young adults within the juvenile jurisdiction.
However, the courts have gone in the opposite direction than the intention of the
founding system of juvenile justice. The punitive adult trends in the adult criminal court
have transcended into the juvenile justice system, where juveniles can be prosecuted as
adults. The mission has shifted away from recognizing juveniles growing stages and
rehabilitation potential towards penalizing juveniles under adult criminal law. Certain
states have implemented a “youthful offender” category for those under 18 years. 263
Youthful offender provisions allow juveniles to be sentenced to harsher standards than
juvenile sentencing, but are less restrictive than adult sentencing standards; 264 a category
that seems more relevant for young adults rather than the younger juvenile age group. In
the U.S. there has been an increase in juvenile cases transferred to adult criminal
260
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courts. 265 Between 1992 and 1999 every state, except for Nebraska, amended its laws
allowing juveniles to be prosecuted as adults. 266 The turnabout appears to mirror reforms
in criminal law. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, harsh sentencing guidelines
increased the use of prison sentences and the length of sentences, even though serious
crime remained stable during this period. 267
One way juveniles are transferred to adult criminal courts is “to lower the upper
age of original juvenile court jurisdiction, which then lowers the age of criminal
responsibility. One change in State law sends a whole cohort of arguably ‘juvenile’
offenders into the auspices of the criminal court, regardless of other factors.” 268 This
practice negatively affects juveniles by forcing adult consequences on teens whose age
and other criteria elevate them to adult criminal law and ignore their developmental
phase. It also positions a larger group within the adult system by lowering the age of
criminal responsibility.
Blended sentences also usher youth into the adult penal system. In some states
lawmakers “gave judges the power to ‘blend’ criminal courts’ sentences with juvenile
court dispositions. Instead of choosing between sentencing a youth in juvenile or adult
court, judges can draw on both systems.” 269 Blended sentencing occurs in three ways:
firstly, juvenile or criminal court judges can place youthful offenders in either juvenile or
adult correctional facilities; secondly, juveniles serving custodial sentences are confined
to juvenile facilities until they reach the age of maturity then they are transferred to an
adult correctional facility; or thirdly, a juvenile can receive a juvenile and adult sentence
simultaneously, 270 which means “[u]pon completion of the juvenile justice sanction, the
adult portion of the sanction is suspended, contingent on the offender’s compliance with
the particular conditions of the disposition.” 271
“By the late 1990s, all fifty states had adopted mandatory minimum sentences,
which mandate incarceration for particular offenses, and sentencing enhancements, which
increase the certainty and severity of punishment when an offense is accompanied with
265
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specific behaviors or traits.” 272 This determinate sentencing also reared in the juvenile
justice system. In some jurisdictions, juveniles can be tried in criminal court and
susceptible to adult sentencing guidelines within the realms of the juvenile courts for
delinquent cases. 273 “These laws require […] juvenile court dispositions to be consistent
with a predefined sentencing menu largely base[d] on the youth’s most recent offense and
prior record.” 274 On one hand, determinate sentencing prevents discrimination by the
court toward offenders, while on the other hand it takes discretion away from the judge
and prohibits adjudicating a case on its individual merits.
It could be argued that the U.S. states’ legislation to transfer juveniles to adult
courts violates the international standards of juvenile justice and the ICCPR. Article
14(4) of the ICCPR states that “[i]n the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be
such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation.” 275 Transferring a juvenile to the adult criminal court imposes adult
sanctions and repercussion which violates the juveniles’ right to rehabilitation.
“In one study comparing the recidivism of youth waived to criminal court with
those retained in juvenile court, the research found that those in the ‘adultified’ group
were more likely to be re-arrested and to commit more serious new offenses; they also reoffended more quickly.” 276 With an increase in under 18 year olds receiving adult
criminal convictions, there is a larger group of offenders facing social exclusion upon
completing their sentences. “Only very recently have states begun to reconsider these
policies [i.e. transferring juveniles to the adult system], in light of the overwhelming
evidence of negative and criminogenic effects of adult trials and sentencing of
children.” 277
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When youth leave jail or prison, are on probation, or have completed their
adult sentences, they carry the stigma of an adult criminal conviction.
They may have difficulty finding a job or getting a college degree to help
them turn their lives around. […] The consequences of an adult conviction
aren’t minor; they are serious, long-term, life-threatening, and in some
cases, deadly. 278
Consequentially, adult sanctions can bring adolescents sentenced under adult
criminal law right back to the criminal justice system – and the revolving doors of the
adult criminal justice system begin.
5. Young Adult Sentencing in the State of Florida
The phrase “youthful offender” typically refers to offenders under 18 years who are
transferred to adult court, but in Florida this phrase refers to sentencing of young adult
offenders in their late teens to mid-twenties. In 1978, the State of Florida passed the
Florida Youthful Offender Act, “to improve the possibility of rehabilitating and
reintegrating young offenders into society by preventing their association with older,
more experienced criminals in prison.” 279 The youthful offender provisions employ
community supervision programs and reduced confinement sentences for young adults
between 18 and 21 years. 280 The act categorizes youthful offenders as a sentenced
defendant who
•
•
•

Is at least 18 but less than 21 years of age at the time of sentencing, or
is under 18 years of age but was prosecuted as an adult pursuant to
chapter 985 F.S.;
Has been found guilty of or has pled nolo contendere or guilty to a
felony, unless he or she was found guilty of a capital or life felony;
and
Has not previously been classified as a youthful offender. 281

The State of Florida’s implementation of measures to address the appropriateness
of young adults in conflict with the law is a small step forward toward devising judicial
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measures relevant to young adulthood. Unfortunately, it only affords measures associated
with confinement sentencing leaving young adults vulnerable to all other aspects of the
criminal process, such as pre-trial detainment, custodial sentences and public criminal
records. The sentencing options for Florida youthful offenders are similar to juvenile and
adult methods: “incarceration, community supervision, or a split sentence.” 282 The Act
also provides sentencing limits, for example, the sentence “cannot be longer than six
years or the maximum sentence for the offense if the maximum sentence is less than six
years.” 283 Despite a six year maximum confinement sentence, young adults are at risk of
being detained for the majority of young adulthood and scarred by institutional living
which interrupts normative social, educational and career development.
The Youthful Offender Act accounts for the protection of young adults by
“require[ing] the department [of corrections] to designate separate institutions and
programs for youthful offenders and requires personnel be specially qualified by training
and experience to operate the institutions and programs.” 284 The separation of youthful
offenders from adult offenders provides security for this age group that is absent in many
other U.S. jurisdictions.
The Youthful Offender Act also places sanctioning discretion in the hands of the
Department of Corrections. For example, inmates who are younger than 25 years can be
classified by corrections as youthful offenders, if the inmate met the youthful offender
criteria, but was not sentenced by the court as such; 285 or if an inmate is less than 25
years old and was ineligible for youthful offender status because they were over 21 years
at the time of sentencing and were sentenced to a term of 10 years or less than corrections
can place them as youthful offenders. 286 In a review of the youthful offender program,
The Florida Senate Committee on Criminal Justice found a greater use of youthful
offender status by corrections rather than the courts. As of June 30, 2009 approximately
68% (2,885 young adults) were designated as youthful offenders by the Department of
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Corrections; whereas, the court designated 31% (1,340 young adults) as youthful
offenders. 287
The Florida Senate’s review of recidivism rates amongst youthful offenders is
similar to what general research about confinement sentences portray: those with a prior
incarceration are more likely to recidivate. The overall recidivism rate for youthful
offender inmates released between 2001 and 2008 is 33% within a period of 36 months of
release, and inmates under 25 years had the highest rate of recidivism out of all age
groups. 288 Within the youthful offender custodial programs there was a 5% lower
recidivism rate for inmates who participated in the Extended Day Program (for longer
sentenced prisoners) and attained Blue Cap status over inmates released from the Basic
Training Program (for shorter sentenced prisoners). 289 The report attributes lower
recidivism amongst Blue Cap inmates to the longer confinement sentence of the
Extended Day Program which allows more time spent in educational and betterment
programs to aid in re-entry. 290 The report does not suggest that confinement was the
reason for lower rates of recidivism, but rather a lengthened opportunity to participate in
education and betterment programs. The results also suggest that shorter custodial
sentences are just as fervently detrimental to young adults as lengthier sentences. A 5%
difference between the custodial programs is hardly a substantial reduction in recidivism,
which suggests that any length of confinement, even custodial sentences offering
programs to aid in re-entry, does not overshadow the long lasting impact of living in an
institution.
The Florida Youthful Offender Act provides criminal court sentencing limits and
correctional care for young adults because of their age, an approach which is used by a
fraction of other U.S. state prison systems and some European states. For example, in
California, juveniles who have been sentenced to prison are detained in juvenile facilities
until their twenty-fifth birthday, 291 at which point they are transferred to an adult
institution to serve their remaining sentence.
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V. Consequences of Adult Criminal Law on Young Adult Offenders
The following is a brief overview of general collateral consequences from adult criminal
procedures and sanctions that disproportionately affect young adults (rather than adults)
because of their age and developmental phase. Young adults are at risk of coming into
contact with punitive adult criminal procedures and sanctions that perpetuate criminal
behavior and diminish future opportunities. “International evidence has consistently
shown that punitive policies yield little of their much sought-after and fervently promised
effect in reducing criminal recidivism.” 292 While punitive measures and collateral
consequences vary by country, or jurisdiction, this section discusses the negative aspects
of confinement, public criminal records and the death penalty on young adult offenders.
The consequences deprive young adults of opportunities and create stigmas before
reaching adulthood.
Young adults’ underdeveloped psychological and neurological functions make
this age group more sensitive to adult criminal procedures and sanctions than adults.
Young adults are at risk of social exclusions from contact with the criminal justice
system. Certain adult criminal law consequences such as pre-trial detention, confinement
sentences and public access to criminal records negatively affects the transition to
adulthood, including developmental maturation, and social attainments (education, work,
family, etc.). Depending on the country’s law, criminal convictions can exclude certain
young adults from jobs, social services, housing, government education and bank loans.
Criminal convictions stigmatize former offenders as people who are eternally dangerous,
untrustworthy or unreliable; and these stigmas can affect employment attainment.
Detention, either as pre-trial detainment or as a sanction, interrupts psychological
maturation and social responsibilities that aid in the transition to adulthood. The prison
system perpetuates reliance on authorities and institutions. Instead of encouraging
independence and self-reliance, which is important for young adult maturation, prisoners
are forced to rely on institutions to provide basic necessities, while other key life skills,
such as education, work, fiscal management and family responsibilities are stunted.
Confinement is also more problematic for young adults than adults because young adults
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are usually in the middle or at the end of their educational careers; and at the beginning of
their work histories. Even a short confinement and break in education or work can have
negative lifelong impacts on young adult offenders as they struggle upon re-entry to pick
up where they left off or begin anew with the stigma of an ex-offender.
Detention also fosters criminal activity especially among impressionable young
adult offenders. “[T]he prison experience exposes young, first-time offenders to higherrisk, more experienced inmates who can influence their lifestyle and help shape their
attitudes.” 293 For example, sentenced violent inmates teach sentenced non-violent
inmates to use violence as power and as a method of survival within institutions. Even
short term sentences designed to “incapacitat[e] criminals is negated if the prison
experience has the long-term effect of escalating frequency of criminal behavior upon
release.” 294
Many countries restrict access to information about individual’s experiences with
the law, but the U.S. allows for public access to court records. 295 This transparency
makes certain socioeconomic attainments more challenging, such as education loans,
public housing assistance and employment. For example, “the credential of a criminal
record provides an official marker of status and suitability for employment that can be
used as an easy screening mechanism by employers.” 296 Where some countries have
protected young adult citizens from public disclosure of criminal records, there remain
social stigmas associated with contact with the criminal justice system and convictions.
Young adults, or adults that received a conviction during their young adult years, grapple
with this lifelong mark of questionable character.
The death penalty is the harshest and most conclusive of all sentencing practices,
and although the human rights community seeks abolition its practice remains in use by
many countries and young adults are not necessarily exempt. Article 37(A) of the CRC
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and Article 6(5) of the ICCPR prohibit the death penalty for those under 18 years. 297 The
IAYRC is the only treaty requiring states to prohibit the death penalty for those under 25
years based on their developmental phase of young adulthood. 298
Generally, the death penalty contributes little to deterrence. For example, in
comparative research studies on “the murder rates in jurisdictions that have abolished the
death penalty with the rates of those that employ the death penalty” 299 results have
routinely demonstrated that death penalty sentences did not effect the homicide rate. 300
Similar research has been conducted between countries with the death penalty and those
who prohibit its use. There was “little evidence that countries with a death penalty have
lower violence rates than those without.” 301 The absence of the deterrence effect of the
death penalty and the developmental phase of young adulthood supports the IAYRC
recommendation to abolish its use for young adults.
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Conclusion
Author June Carbone poses an essential reflective question regarding the transition to
adulthood: “if fully independent decision-making is unlikely before the mid-twenties,
what is the best way to guide the transition throughout the years likely to shape adult
prospects and potential?” 302 Furthermore, what is the best way to guide young adult
offenders through the criminal justice system to shape current development and
potential?
Young adulthood is a social category underscored by a biological component. 303
Age, is one of the biological components, and it is also a risk factor for criminal
behavior 304 – a characteristic that young adult’s cannot abandon. Explanations for young
adults’ behaviors, situated between a teen and adult, are supported by developmental
psychology and neuroscience. Developmental psychology indicates that areas of the brain
associated with many aptitudes of development continue to formulate between
adolescence and young adulthood. 305 Neuroscience has supported these claims with brain
images, which “reinforces […] that, as a group, young people differ from adults in
systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, deterrability, and potential
for rehabilitation.” 306
Given the underlying behavioral and developmental science components of young
adulthood, scholars and scientists have recommended the adjudication of young adults
separately from adult criminal procedures and sanctions. Some laws and jurisdictions
have enacted measures that address the stage of young adulthood by including young
adults within the juvenile jurisdiction or creating a separate category for young adult
offenders that relies on less punitive criminal justice measures than the adult system. As
arbitrary and paradoxical as age criteria may be, it remains necessary to design
parameters of adjudication that are aligned with the current research on childhood and
young adulthood. As the IAYRC has recommended and jurisdictions within Europe have
demonstrated there are options for young adult offenders; preferably the inclusion of
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those under 25 years within the juvenile jurisdiction or a third category for young adults,
which protects young adults from the adult criminal scheme.
In order to have special procedures for adjudicating young adults there must be a
clear cut juvenile justice system in place. The juvenile system must decide between
including those under 25 years; or maintaining an upper age limit for under 18 years (as
directed by the Straight 18 approach) and not transferring juveniles to the upper system,
so a third category for young adult offenders could be in place. The goal of resolving
young adult offender cases should focus on young adults’ amenability to rehabilitation,
and aim to protect them from the consequences of the adult system that interrupt life
course development and sanctions that create social exclusion that follow them through
life.
Drawing on research on young adult development, regional and domestic
practices, and recognizing the life altering consequences of criminal procedures and
convictions on young adult offenders, the author recommends to international human
rights law and domestic jurisdictions that young adult offenders between 18 and 24 years
are protected from: mandatory minimum sentences, life without parole sentences, the
death penalty, public disclosure of criminal records and confinement sentences should be
resorted to as a last option. These recommendations not only bring about changes for
young adult offenders, but also society.
The potential benefits from a more effective response to offending by
Young Adults can be split into various types, principally:
• benefits to young adult prospective offenders enabled to follow a more
constructive and engaged life path
• benefits to the Government from reduced spending on the Criminal
Justice System and
• benefits to households and the private sector from reduced
victimization rates, reduced fear of crime and lower spending on crime
prevention as offending falls. 307
Criminal law is adaptable and it “is constantly evolving in an effort to reflect
social and economic conditions.” 308 It may “also change because of shifts in culture and
307
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social conventions, reflecting a newfound tolerance of behavior condemned only a few
years before.” 309 Research shows that there have been shifts in social, cultural and
economic practices thus extending the transition to adulthood; furthermore, behavioral
and scientific evidence demonstrate that young adults are not full-fledged adults despite
their inclusion in certain responsibilities and consequences. International human rights
law and criminal law should reflect the social and scientific findings on young adulthood
by either including young adults under 25 years within the juvenile jurisdiction or
implementing a third category for young adult offenders.
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